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Benedict Anderson claims In Imagined Communities that nationalism and national identity are but fruits 
of a politicised imagination, and that the nation only acts what the State imagines. A decade later, in 
Tom Inglis re-examines such an imagination in a postcolonial Irish context, and traces the significance 
of the land in the process of identity formation. Anderson’s and Inglis’s understanding of personal 
identity formation resonate with the Deleuzian reading of a Rhizome-based local identity set against a 
monolithic backdrop of root-tree system. Where the former variety promises an animate, multifaceted 
identity, the latter conditions the development of Irishness to a closed system in which values are yet to 
be pronounced by the governing root, namely, the State. This is where one can draw the very red thin 
line between personal and national perception of reality (of being). The multilayered and dialectical 
nature of the modern Irish novel and its critical caliber has created an accurate touchstone that enables 
the Irish to identify the very two sides of reality. For the Irish, on the one hand, reality emerges as a 
monolithic, obdurate construct, fabricated and observed by the State; and on the other, it materialises as 
the nation’s memory of economic hardships, political marginalisation, ideological bifurcations, and 
psychological exiles. By exploring James Joyce’s A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man (1916) and 
Flann O’Brien’s The Third Policeman (1974), this paper shall answer the question that Anderson and 
Inglis failed to address: what made the contemporary Irish literature a difficult reflection of postcolonial 
identity, which neither accepts the State’s atavistic nativism nor identifies with neocolonial political 
mindset? 
 





The greatest triumph of human thought was the calculation of Neptune 
from the observed vagaries of the orbit of Uranus. Samuel Beckett, 
Dream of Fair to Middling Women, 1932, p.221 
 
While we look not at the things which are seen, but at the things which 
are not seen: for the things which are seen are temporal; but the things 
which are not seen are eternal. 
2 Corinthians 4:18 
 
In Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 
(1991), Benedict Anderson introduces nationhood and nationalism as the actual fruits 
of a collective imagination. He identifies a concept as fleeting as nationhood as a sum 
of ‘imagined political communities’ in which individuals are not allowed to seek other 
possible manifestations of communal reality, as in the form of liberal, social, post-
colonial, post-republican, post-capitalist communities and so on (p. 6). Nor can they 
come close to experience what they initially imagined, namely, individual and national 
identity. The state of nationhood, in this respect, provokes a Deleuzian vision of a 
monolithic State, be it colonial or postcolonial, as a root-tree structure. In A Thousand 
Plateaus (1987) Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari introduce the concept of rhizome 
and rhizomatic formation and set it against the backdrop of an arborescent body, 
namely, a tree-like system. For Deleuze and Guattari, it is the multiplex structure of 
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rhizome, including a complex matrix of entries and exits that allows for a rhizomatic 
identity to form and develop a more diverse understanding of society, culture and 
nationality. On the contrary, the dualistic nature of the root-tree structure considers the 
government as the root and the original image of nationhood, and the nation as only 
scattered branches or outer barks without any sense of independence or identity. It is 
the root that allows for the personal and social assumptions to enter its closed inner 
body and accumulate as much as need be. Only then this shower of socio-cultural, 
political and personal data can be distributed through a select number of channels such 
as institutional pedagogy, or other state-sponsored institutions. 
Where the rhizomatic structure enables the nation to maintain transnational 
identities through cross-cultural interconnection, and thus identify with a dynamic 
sense of history and culture, the root-tree structure allows for the individual to 
synthesise and obtain a sense of identity insofar as they follow the governing root. 
Personal identity, therefore, in light of Anderson’s arborescent vision, can be seen as a 
flat imitation of national identity, being devoid of individual traits. The individual, in 
such a system, can only observe a distorted reality of socio-cultural rootedness in which 
the State’s politics of chastity, namely, the unity of the (mother) land, the State’s 
dominance, and national obedience, suppress the pertinence and significance of 
individual identity. 
A decade after Anderson, in Local Belonging, Identities and Sense of Place in 
Contemporary Ireland (2001) Tom Inglis re-visits the very duality of national and 
personal identity, and places it in the context of a postcolonial Ireland. Inglis 
commences his reading of contemporary Irish identity and nationality and its difficult 
interactions with the world by raising the following ontological question: “what 
importance does identity with place have in the ongoing construction and 
redevelopment of personal and social identities?” (2001, p. 2). Inglis’s nativist 
argument, too, invokes Deleuze’s arborescent reading of politicised structures and calls 
for a united Ireland, emphasising the significance of the land as a notable personal and 
social ‘marker’ in one’s process of understanding the reality of being. However, he like 
Anderson failed to appreciate the significance of a personal aspect of reality and its 
undeniable role in confirming or rejecting socio-cultural realities that Giorgio Agamben 
calls “the governmental paradigm” (2013). For Terrence Brown, quoting Thomas 
Kilroy, addressing this very politicised paradigm by way of a clever design is in the 
“DNA” of the modern Irish fiction (2006, p. 205). The design, as Kilroy claims, is 
neither historically prejudiced nor politically partial; rather, it is externalized as,  
 
A voice heard over and over again, whatever its accent, a voice in a supreme 
confidence in its own histrionics, one what shares with its audience a shared 
ownership of the told tale and all that it implies: a taste for anecdote, an 
unshakeable belief in the value of human action, a belief that life may be 
adequately encapsulated into stories that require no reference, no qualifications 
beyond their own selves.                      (1972, p. 301) 
 
By exploring the available literature, especially James Joyce’s A Portrait of the 
Artist as a Young Man (1916), and Flann O’Brien’s The Third Policemen (1974), 1 this 
paper seeks to justify the relevance of the modern Irish novel and its anecdotal essence, 
which has so far allowed the nation to transcend political stratifications. Bearing this 
very essence, then the paper answers the questions Anderson and Inglis failed to 
address, namely, what made the contemporary Irish literature a difficult reflection of 
postcolonial identity, which neither accepts the State’s atavistic nativism nor identifies 
with neocolonial imagery? And, how does a personal definition of reality of being 
differ from the State’s postcolonial vision? 
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FROM REALITY TO VIRTUALITY: CHALLENGING THE STATE’S  
REALITY WITH VIRTUALITY 	  
The multilayered and dialogical nature of the modern Irish novel and its critical caliber 
has created an accurate touchstone that enables the Irish to identify the very two sides 
of reality. On the one hand, reality emerges as a monolithic, obdurate construct, 
fabricated and observed by the root-tree State; yet on the other, reality manifests itself 
as the nation’s branched memories of economic hardships, political marginalisation, 
ideological bifurcations, and psychological exiles. 
In A Portrait of the Artist as A Young Man (1916), James Joyce initially 
engages with an introspective examination of the reality of being, and only then 
embarks upon an external deconstruction of such double standards advocated by a 
supposedly postcolonial State. Stephen’s reading of his Irishness is Heideggerian at 
best. For Stephen Dedalus, the primordial binaries of philosophy, namely, existence 
and essence on the one hand, and time and non-temporality on the other, can be defined 
only internally. He, therefore, first questions the binary of a postcolonial existence and 
a fascist essence, and then pinpoints such concepts in an external postcolonial reality of 
post-independence Ireland. Only by forming a personal, temporally conscious 
perception of reality, as Gabriel Ricci maintains, can he understand and find a “cure for 
overcoming time, [or] the nightmare of history” for the “origins that now occupy time” 
and a historically conditioned reality are not “cosmogonic but self-constituting” (2002, 
p. 79). As Ricci argues, a Heideggerian solution to the Irish plights of governmental 
marginalisation and involvement with a State-sponsored reality informs Stephen’s 
grasp of an Irish problem: “the past”; for it “is never over and done with” for this 
nation, and is “continuously used over again” (2002, p. 79).  
Stephen emerges as a protagonist who not only replaces a Yeatsian hero,2 by 
highlighting the self-centered, twentieth-century roots of his artistic perception of 
reality, but also as Ricci astutely notes, “rises above the prison of his homeland, his 
religion, and even his language” by way of self-criticism and self-refashioning (2002, 
p. 15). Joyce’s Stephen, I argue, suddenly becomes an Irish reincarnation of what the 
student in Goethe’s Faust underwent, namely, he needed to know what something is 
before he could dissect that something into separate, intelligible pieces, or in Stephen’s 
words “an object achieves its epiphany” when “its soul, its whatness, leaps to us from 
the vestment of its appearance” (Joyce 1916, p. 218). 
This very stratified conception of the outside world can be seen in Italo 
Calvino’s fastidious understanding of reality, namely, a result of personal intellectual 
survey of the distorted and the original. In his reading of Carlo Emilio Gadda’s The 
Awful Mess on the Via Merulana (1957), Calvino taps into an understanding that 
introduces reality as a sum of a larger equation: “to know […] what is real” one should 
“insert something [of one’s own perception] into” it and hence “distort reality” (1993, 
p. 108). What Stephen needed to ‘insert’ into his young understanding of the outside 
world to be able to deconstruct a State-sponsored vision of postcolonial reality was 
neither a concept nor a theoretical matrix. Rather, it was an inscriptive mode of 
language that could communicate his intrapersonal observations of his nation in flux. In 
other words, Stephen had to write about what would provoke self-reflexive spontaneity 
and a sudden rush of fresh socio-cultural examination, which transcends a superfluous 
mimesis of everyday life, which I shall call an epiphanic écriture. By this, Joyce and his 
surrogate could not only “destruct”, as Kevin Dettmar claims, “every [other] voice, 
[and] every point of origin” that would stand as political artifacts but create a space, 
perhaps by way of distortion, in which he could rid the nation of constructed identities 
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and only then have a fresh look at postcoloniality, especially its Irish variety (1996, p. 
127). The result is neither a variety of hyper-reality nor a figment of one’s 
imagination;3 rather, it emerges as an intimate recreation of objective reality. 
Stephen’s artistic command of language as a catalyst in his rite of passage, 
namely, from his time as a mentee in A Portrait to becoming a mentor in Ulysses, 
grants him the right to examine, criticise and at once reconstitute his national and 
personal definition of history as an evident reality in the wake of revolution and 
independence. To polish his lingual criticism, he inserts another element into his 
reading of history: Latin, a language that is foreign and at once local, at least 
religiously. While the question as to why he didn’t fully appropriate Gaelic as his 
lingual alternative remains a mystery, Latin provides a personal and national intimacy 
for the Irish to communicate their most inner personal states vis-à-vis “lost causes”:  
 
We were always loyal to the lost causes, the professor said. Success for us is the 
death of the intellect and of imagination. We were never loyal to the successful. 
We serve them. I teach the blatant Latin language. I speak the tongue of a race 
the acme of whose mentality is the maxim: time is money. Material domination. 
Dominus! Lord! […] Lord Jesus! Lord Salisbury. A sofa in a westend club. 
                                 (Joyce 1922, p. 298) 
 
What makes Stephen’s criticism novel, however, is his inclusion of memory as 
yet another alternative reservoir of reality, being deeply rooted in one’s perception of 
not only time but events that are bound by the element of time such as the Irish wars of 
independence. Stephen’s epiphanic and hence temporal consciousness resonates with 
what in Time and Free Will (2001) Henri Bergson calls the temporal consciousness, 
namely, an understanding of the state of things in the backdrop of time, in which time 
can be viewed and reviewed within a cyclical time-space continuum. Where Bergson 
introduces time as a mobile, instantly dynamic and fleeting concept, Stephen’s 
epiphanic consciousness introduces memory as an inseparable dimension of perceiving 
reality wherein one may view and re-view time endlessly and reject the claim which 
regards the past as a disposable signifier which represents a limited number of concepts 
within a specific context. For Stephen, I argue, the past as in the form of a memory of 
an event is not a paralysed phenomenon, a “lifeless thought” as Ricci claims, “which 
has taken up residence in an attic where old things are stored” (2002, p. 15). Rather, 
memory is a lingual resource that allows the nation to revisit their past and reconsider 
their present understanding of what and how things are: “the past is consumed in the 
present, and the present live only because it gives birth to the future” (Joyce 1916, p. 
286).  
Joyce’s Bergsonian grasp of time in A Portrait not only continues until the 
latter part of his first narrative but matures in Ulysses where time is presented as an 
element which can be measured in light of how events, materials, and especially 
individuals as both material agents and agents in events are changed and transformed; 
in Leopold Bloom’s words then, “Wonder is there any magnetic influence between the 
person because that was about the time. Yes, I suppose, at once. Back of everything 
magnetism. Earth for instance pulling this and being pulled. That causes movement. 
And time? Well that’s the time movement takes” (Joyce 1922, p. 849). For Joyce and 
his surrogates, the reality of being, I suggest, can be regarded as a confluence of events 
and materials known as ‘movement’ conditioned by a cyclical presentation of time 
whereby individuals may experience temporal transformation in the physical reality, 
and then re-experience the same phenomena yet only internally as in a mental variety 
of reality. Where A Portrait revisits “once upon a time” by seeking a particular “good 
time”, presenting it as possible time when Stephen’s supra-temporal consciousness was 
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in the forming, Ulysses presents time as a memory of Stephen’s and Leopold’s personal 
transformation and movement (Joyce 1916, p. 1). 
In Simulacra and Simulation (1994) Jean Baudrillard spearheads a subtle look 
back at the definitional categories of the real, the symbolic and the unreal by discussing 
Jorge Luis Borges’s one-paragraph short story “On Exactitute in Science” (1961). 
Borges’s allegorical description of the map, namely, the simulacrum and the territorial 
land, and the way the former as an abstract construct covers and eventually precedes, if 
not replaces, the latter led Baudrillard to maintain that the land as the original concept 
no longer includes any sense of superiority of realness over the map; nor does it bear 
any resemblance to that which we came to know as the real land, namely, the physical 
kingdom of an empire. The land, in this respect, is not a real, alive concept which 
actuates existence and can be distinguished from an abstract unreality of the map. 
Rather, through time the land has become the unreal, the unknown, namely, a desert 
that has lost its significance over the reality of the map.  
While Anderson and Inglis anchor national identity and nationhood to the land, 
I contend that such a perception of nationhood and identity engages with nothing but a 
precession of simulacra and at once simulation in a democratic trend.4 While Joyce’s A 
Portrait reads as his first attempt at highlighting the start of the process of simulation in 
a post-colonial Ireland, Ulysses (1922) and especially Finnegans Wake (1939) provide 
an inside look at a State-sponsored labyrinth of lost signifiers and misread signified in a 
post-independence Ireland. The land, as a significant marker in Irishness and modern 
Irish identity appears as nothing but a path or even a Bergsonian event in Ulysses that 
includes untold stories for Stephen, Celtic myths forgotten in the abyss of time, and 
unraveled narratives of affairs for Bloom and Molly. Dublin as the land loses its 
significance and emerges as a mere canvas or a bare material which functions only as a 
container for intentionally unreal references to a bygone past. Dublin, thus, emerges as 
a forgotten barren desert that appears less real and less original than Homer’s mythical 
description of Ithaca, while Odysseus’s tales bear a level of reality and can compete 
with Stephen’s and Bloom’s narrative of formation in Ulysses. 
For Baudrillard, lack of distinctive features between simulacra and reality 
results in a number of anomalies the most notable of which is the emergence of a 
language which systematically sympathises with the coloniser. This variety of language 
either heralds the return of the real, namely, an ethos of anti-colonial dissidence mixed 
with Gaelic as the national language, which is now known by the Irish as an uncanny 
that had ceased to exist; or itself has been appropriated by the simulacra, and hence 
used as a means of further dominance and control. My contention is that Stephen once 
more unbalances such normalised binaries and desired structures by presenting a third 
form, albeit inscriptive and critical: a dialectical variety of language that sieves through 
the nation’s memories in search of personal, historical and national artifacts. Stephen’s 
epiphanic écriture, functions as a mouthpiece that discusses the possibilities of the 
return of the repressed real, namely, a long coveted return to the Celtic history of 
bravery, unity and Yeatsian Heroism. However, the language also warns the nation 
against an Irish desert of postcoloniality by engaging with their subjective, personal 
consciousness rather than their national conscience, the latter appears to be severely 
affected by a zeitgeist of paralysis and indifference as especially seen in Dubliners 
(1914).5  
Joyce portrays such a subliminal epiphanic interaction with the nation’s 
subjective consciousness in A Portrait. In the “pull out his eyes” moment, Joyce 
depicts two adults, representing the tree system, who try to invite a recalcitrant 
Stephen, representing a younger Ireland, to submit to their will by installing a sense of 
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guilt in him (1916, p. 8). Not only does the tactic fail to activate and instill guilt in 
Stephen, but it unconsciously triggers an innate sense of resistance, making him turn 
inward and defy their coercive pretentious theatricality. This very sense of resistance 
continues the tale of a modern consciousness in the formation which Joyce had already 
begun in the first lines of A Portrait. In other words, one can say that Stephen comes to 
being in a time of coercion and enforced compliance. Stephen as the subject of coercion 
and subordination, I argue, transforms into a subject of resistannce and autonomy. 
From being an anonymous audience, remembering and revisiting his father’s moocow 
bedtime story, Stephen’s epiphanic consciousness, albeit still embryonic and immature, 
transforms him into an idiosyncratic ‘I’, being rooted in his first memory of his 
childhood. Stephen’s epiphanic relevance, I argue, can be read as an internalised 
rhizomatic response, albeit unconscious to him at this stage, to the arborescent rules 
that governed such an invitation: an autonomous, egoistic call that would resist a 
monolithic invitation of submission. 
As Sharon Kim confirms in Literary Epiphany (2012), Joyce discusses the 
presence of yet another contradiction at the heart of a Post-independence, Postcolonial 
Irish society: forming any personal vision is punishable by a Deleuzian paternal law, 
placing the individual at the end of the triangle of daddy-mommy-me.6 In the first 
epiphany, the eagles will take out the eyes of the bad child should he fail to apologise, 
the threat associates eyes as something quite personal with guilt, the latter being an 
even more personal concept that is rooted in the individual’s inner perception of right 
and wrong. As Stephen resists the adults’ cartoonish urge to submit and apologise, he 
reaches a threshold of autonomy and critical understanding that is early for his age yet 
at once necessary for the formation and continuity of his famous Dedalus – eque 
epiphanic consciousness. The eyes, in this respect, transcend the basic duality of 
submission and belonging or resistance and exile, here an Apollonian punishment. The 
eye, a Joycean pun, form the very infrastructure of individualism and individualistic 
understanding of the outer reality, a prime function of the eyes that introduce the world. 
As the novel unravels, Stephen heavily relies on his vision to understand not only the 
basics of individual identity but art and aesthetic reasoning. First, Kim argues, Stephen 
understands that the punishing eagles are “fair envoys from the courts of life” and yet a 
moment later, in another epiphanic moment when confronted with the girl who made 
fun of his name, he realises that his name Dedalus contains a hidden notion of flying, 
art and punishment as well (2012, p. 37). Throughout his narrative, Stephen toys with 
such dichotomies and contradictions in the form of images such as birds and wings, 
prison and the altar, which tend to hide, if not replace, the original outer reality. 
Stephen Dedalus, in this respect, emerges as the zenith of Joycean, postmodern 
yet at once postcolonial, if not anti-colonial, characterisation, who not only attacks the 
foundation of the State as in the trio of the Church, the nation and family but questions 
a postcolonial Simulacra imposed by a parochial State. Joyce leads such an attack by 
highlighting Stephen’s lack of confidence and trust in the chapel of the college, where 
they received the controversial sermon on yet another Simulacra, namely, the fall of 
Adam and Eve, and Satan’s infamous non serviam. Excited by a romanticised 
sublimation of the sermon, Stephen approaches the priest for a confession, yet what 
stops him is neither the bulk of his sins nor a lack of self-confidence. Rather, it is the 
birth of a new reality being wedded to an internal desire that not only stops him from 
confessing his puerile sins but also provides him with a leeway to reflect on the 
veracity of the image misused by the Church: the fall.  
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Father, I … 
The thought slid like a cold shining rapier into his tender flesh: confession. But 
not there in the chapel of the college. He would confess all, every sin of deed and 
thought, sincerely; but not there […]. Far away from there in some dark place he 
would murmur his own shame; and he besought God humbly not to be offended 
with him if he did not dare to confess in the college chapel and in utter abjection 
of spirit he craved forgiveness mutely of the boyish hearts about him.  
                                 (Joyce 1916, p. 144) 
 
For recalcitrant characters like Stephen, confession and such Foucauldian self-
cancelling deeds appear as barren realities that rid the individual of their inner ‘I’, 
namely, the most independent feature that shapes one’s identity.  
 
A flame began to flutter again on Stephen’s cheek as he heard in this proud 
address an echo of his own proud musings […] How often had he seen himself as 
a priest wielding calmly and humbly the awful power of which angels and saints 
stood in reverence! His soul had loved to muse in secret on this desire.  
                (Joyce 1916, p. 180) 
 
For Joyce and his fictional surrogate, the many faces of reality can be 
appreciated and dissected only internally and within the boundaries of one’s self-
centered, dialectical perception, presented either comically or sardonically. This is 
when the individual can compare the State’s definition of reality with the nation’s 
memories of socio-political plights and marginalisation. In other words, for critics such 
as Joyce, reality is a mere reflection of their individual conscious memories, collected 
and curated through years of civil and national wars, and internal colonisation after the 
rise of the State: “side by side with his memory of the deeds of prowess of his uncle 
Mat Davin, the athlete, the young peasant worshipped the sorrowful legend of Ireland” 
(Joyce 1916, p. 205). 
In his discussion of Irish history as a selectively forgetful national Irish 
memory, James Smith claims that the modern Irish novel bears a level of reality that 
the State has emphatically labeled as pure fiction and thus negligible.7 However, I 
suggest that these stark illustrations of Irish society and Irishness in the modern Irish 
novel seek one objective: to defy the State’s politics of confinement by highlighting the 
unforgettables.8 As Paul Ricoeur notes, “fiction gives eyes to the horrified narrator. 
Eyes to see and to weep” (1996, p. 180). The modern Irish novel, in this regard, 
emerges as a radical form that challenges the historical memory of the State and those 
official narratives that were formed to control the nation and the Irish identity, and at 
the same time transforms into a form that reveals what the State deemed to be 
forgotten.  
The confluence of Irish radicalism and modern Irishness forms a resistant 
dialogism that targets the nostalgic, retrograde discourse used by the national 
narrative.9 The voice then appears in the form of an Irishness in crisis, which at once 
defies the State and the concomitant sense of nationalism as its cheap product;10 it then 
dislikes British ideals, admonishes the apparent limits of nationalism, and yet seeks 
affinity with the radical men of 1916. 
Such a critically dialectical and at once personalised perception of reality can 
also be read in light of Gilles Deleuze’s definition of reality and virtuality. In 
Dialogues II (1987), discussing “The Actual and the Virtual”, Deleuze engages with 
the concept of multiplicity as a self-contained, introverted nucleus which functions as 
the essential base for every event and formation. In other words, Deleuze’s multiplicity 
can be seen as a hermaphroditic manifestation of Baudrillard’s Simulacra and 
Simulation wherein the copied and the process of reality-making converge over one 
shared concept. In this respect, physical reality for critics like Deleuze is reduced to a 
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variety of reality that is sensible in terms of tangible, factual incidents which shape at 
least the façade of reality. At the heart of the concept of multiplicity, Deleuze argues, 
sits the binary of virtuality and actuality, namely, a duality that decides on the fate of 
events and formations. However, for Deleuze and his specificity of multiplicity, 
“purely actual objects do not exist. Every actual surrounds itself with a cloud of virtual 
images. This cloud is composed of a series of more or less extensive coexisting circuits, 
along which the virtual images are distributed” (1987, p. 148).  
By this definition, a Deleuzian reality is nothing but a series of mental data that 
interconnects with a physical phenomenon, a conceptual image, or a memory of an 
event. In this light, one can read the virtual as memories linked closely with the 
physical phenomenon. However, what distances virtuality from actuality in Deleuzian 
definition is threefold: the virtual is a memory that is quite lucid yet at once forgettable; 
the virtual emerges as an impeccable mental copy of the physical phenomenon that at 
times replaces the actual; and finally the instantaneous replaceability of data regarding 
a virtual nucleus in the individual’s mind. 
 
These virtuals vary in kind as well as in their degree of proximity from the actual 
particles by which they are both emitted and absorbed. They are called virtual in 
so for as their emission and absorption, creation and destruction, occur in a period 
of time shorter than the shortest continuous period imaginable; it is this very 
brevity that [in spite of their accurate point of reference to the actual / physical 
world] keeps them subject to a principle of uncertainty or indetermination […] 
These are memories of different sorts, but they are still called virtual images in 
that their speed or brevity subjects them too to a principle of the unconsciousness.                 
(Deleuze 1987, pp. 148-49) 
 
According to Deleuze, memory functions as an indefinite reservoir of virtuals 
which surround and simultaneously define the actual, namely, the real. Combined with 
a ceaseless stream of data vis-à-vis an actual event as well as the individual’s conscious 
analysis of the real, memory emerges as the very catalyst that enables a nation to 
challenge, question or defy a politicised variety of their historical reality. In this light, 
for Deleuze virtuality stands as a more real ground than reality due to the very 
assumption that the former incorporates the individual’s faculty as well as their 
analytical prowess in having a multidimensional examination of a static physical 
reality. 
Virginia Woolf entertains the same connection between mental reality and 
actual reality. For Woolf, the inextricable interconnectedness between memory as the 
reservoir of the virtual reality and one’s mental analytical faculties provides a more 
lucid reality compared to a static, physical reality. In “Modern Fiction” (1925), 
discussing her methodology in collecting and combining data for describing fictional 
realities, Woolf expresses her complex understanding of the superiority of virtual or 
mental reality over physical reality as follows: 
 
Examine for a moment an ordinary mind on an ordinary day. The mind receives a myriad 
[of] impressions – trivial, fantastic, evanescent, or engraved with the sharpness of steel. 
From all sides they come, an incessant shower of innumerable atoms; and as they fall, […] 
they shape themselves into the life of Monday or Tuesday.      (p.175) 
 
Not only is the Woolfian definition of mental reality relevant to the current 
discussion of the postcolonial duality of a politicised reality and a national reality, but it 
also confirms the existence of a divide between an individual and a national perception 
of reality. The former leads to the formation of a State-sponsored national literature 
while the latter, as Italo Calvino suggests, causes the emergence of “the novel as an 
encyclopedia” that resonates with a Deleuzian concept of multiplicity and individual 
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mental reality (1993, p. 105). It is the multi-layered nature of the latter that materialises 
as a variation of the Deleuzian minor literature and defies a normalised definition of 
reality by introducing the personal as more real than national. In a Žiźekian reading, the 
real presented by the authoritative State emerges as nothing but a barren desert covered 
by glamorous simulacra, namely, grand commemorations and centenaries, while 
personal reality emerges as an accurate account of national hardships. 
The conflict between a State-sponsored, normalised reality and the nation’s 
socio-politically conscious memory of the plights that plagued the Irish in the wake of 
the rise of a postcolonial State makes the crux of the modern Irish novel. It is the latter 
reality, namely, the people’s memories of physical events that shape a resistant body of 
knowledge or a “network of connections between the events, the people, and the things 
of the world” (Calvino 1992, p. 105). Such a resistant and at once prismatic vision of 
reality in the form of a network of memories can be found in a plethora of modern Irish 
novels, especially those of Samuel Beckett, Flann O’Brien and even contemporaries 
such as Colm Tóibín and Patrick McCabe.11 In what follows, however, we will focus 
on the red thin line between the vagaries, if not the dualities, of reality in a personal and 
national sense in Flann O’Brien’s The Third Policeman (1974). 
  
 
A PRISMATIC LOOK AT REALITY IN THE THIRD POLICEMAN 	  
On February 14th 1940 Flann O’Brien wrote to William Saroyan, explaining not only 
his new novel, The Third Policeman, but what made it “pretty new” with great 
excitement: 
 
I’ve just finished another book. The only thing good about it is the plot and I’ve 
been wondering whether I could make a crazy … play out of it. When you get to 
the end of this book you realise that my hero or main character (he’s a heel and a 
killer) has been dead throughout the book. […] I think the idea of a man being 
dead all the time is pretty new. When you are writing about the world of the dead 
– and the damned – where none of the rules and laws (not even the law of 
gravity) holds good.  
(Southern Illinois University File No. p. 187) 
 
However, the element that made The Third Policeman genuinely different was 
neither its plot nor its portrayal of ‘a man being dead all the time’. Whether O’Brien 
hadn’t heard about Máirtín ÓCadhan’s An Broan Brogach (1948) or his masterpiece 
Cré na Cille (1949) [translated as The Dirty Dust by Alan Titley in 2015 and The 
Graveyard Dust by Liam Mac Con Iomaire and Tim Robinson in 2016] or had been too 
busy crafting his own pièce de résistance remains a mystery, especially that The Third 
Policeman wasn’t officially published until 1967. The novelty of The Third Policeman 
lies in a conscious awakening that captures the narrator, albeit ‘repetitive and 
interminable’, and transmogrifies his perception of the real. In other words, for the 
narrator the concept of the real changes from that which he had already experienced to 
what can be ‘re-experienced’ by unlearning any previously offered sense of reality; or 
in the narrator’s words by way of “fresh-forgetting of the unremembered” (O’Brien 
1974, p. 173). This prismatic, textual manifestation of reality, albeit removed in later 
revisions from the novel, appears when the dead voice discusses how ‘Joe’ also known 
as John Divney has spearheaded a new beginning for not only him but the bewildered 
reader to re-examine an uncanny dimension of reality: 
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Joe had been explaining things in the meantime. He said it was again the 
beginning of the unfinished, the re-discovery of the familiar, the re-experience of 
the already suffered, the fresh-forgetting of the unremembered. Hell goes round 
and round. In shape it is circular and by nature it is interminable, repetitive.  
                           (O’Brien 1974, p.173) 
 
The real for O’Brien’s narrator excitingly resembles that of Máirtín ÓCadhan as for 
both reality is inseparably tied with a microcosmic vision of the outside world. In a 
lecture delivered to Cumann Merriam in 1970, a year before he passed away, ÓCadhan 
explains a personal definition of reality, its relation to literature, and how the 
confluence these would result in a cosmogonic literature: 
 
The most important thing now in literature is to reveal the mind, that part of a 
person on which the camera cannot be directed. Speech is much more capable of 
this than observations about his cloth his complexion…. It is not what covers a 
person’s skin that is important, or even the skin, but that which he is walking 
about with inside his head. We know more about the stars in the firmament than 
about what’s going on under that small skull beside you. 
             (2016, p. 50) 
 
EPISODIC MEMORY, EPISODIC REALITY 	  
It is by mental examination of the physical parameters that one can understand and then 
compare their own version of reality with what actually has been materialised. Where 
Beckett understands “the greatest triumph of human thought” to be “the calculation of 
Neptune from the observed vagaries of the orbit of Uranus” in Dream of Fair to 
Middling Women (1932, p. 221), and indirectly distinguishes between individual reality 
and anything else, O’Brien’s narrator in The Third Policeman ushers a new path to 
roam and ‘reveal the mind’. For O’Brien’s narrator reality can been understood only 
internally vis-à-vis through one’s mind. Therefore, the means to reveal the mind, I 
argue, for him is twofold: an episodic memory and only then understanding time in a 
non-linear, rather ‘circular’ fashion. The latter resonates with Stephen Dedalus’s 
epiphanic consciousness and thus can be read in light of Bergson’s ‘temporal 
consciousness.’ In this respect, time appears to the narrator as an acceptably circular, 
“repetitive, and very nearly unbearable” loop which he can review and re-experience 
(O’Brien 1974, p. 173).  
However, it is the former, namely, understanding O’Brien’s fantastic narrative 
in light of an episodic consciousness that not only pushes the modern literature, 
especially its Irish variation beyond a Proustian legacy of temporal consciousness and 
involuntary memory but works in tandem with the narrator’s Bergsonian grasp of time 
as a circular element. The result, I argue, is an unprecedented personalised command of 
reality which is neither solipsistic nor contra-materialistic. Rather, it is essentially 
mental and naturally dynamic in illustrating the harsh unjustness of the outside reality, 
especially in allowing the narrator to not just re-live but question the validity of his past 
and present actions. “I did not go home direct from school. I spend some months in 
other places broadening my mind […]. In one of the places where I was broadening my 
mind I met one night with a bad accident”, reveals the narrator, re-visiting his past in an 
episodic, fragmented attempt (O’Brien 1974, p. 9).  
The next episode reveals a belated consciousness that had eventually appeared 
to him: “I broke my left leg (or, if you like, it was broken for me) in six places” 
(O’Brien 1974, p. 9). Not only is the narrator unsure as to how he has broken his leg 
while ‘broadening his mind’ or was it broken for him, but he leaves the last stage of his 
understanding to the last statement: “when I was well enough again to go my way I had 
one leg made of wood, the left one” (O’Brien 1974, p. 9). The narrator’s attempts at 
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recreating and revisiting a past that is vague at best is not just limited to retrieving 
sensibly accurate references from his memory; rather, he merges such representational 
episodes with other fragmented memories insofar as they allow him to complete a 
significant puzzle: “I had long-since got to know how I was situated in the world” 
(ibid). In other words, the narrator struggles to recreate knowledge by reexamining past 
memories rather than re-fabricating and retelling old fantasies. In this respect, reality 
for O’Brien’s narrator, which I shall call episodic reality, is as virtual, personal and 
mental as Stephen’s epiphanic consciousness, and as resistant to any prescriptiveness of 
the physical reality as Deleuze’s rhizomatic virtuality. 
In “Précis of Elements of Episodic Memory” (1984), Endel Tulving introduces 
the concept of episodic memory as a significant module of declarative memory. For 
Tulving declarative memory draws a thin line between knowing, namely, semantic 
memory, and remembering. Where knowing consists of acquiring knowledge and 
applying it to a more physical reality, remembering, Tulving argues, is structured 
around previously experienced knowledge and only reviewing it psychologically. The 
latter crafts a mental reality that shares its founding attributes such as having an 
expandable and modular reality based on memory with a Deleuzian specificity of 
virtuality. In Tulving’s system, remembering is seen as a process of retrieval and 
decoding, leaving the concept of re-discovering the past to either semantic memory or 
other fields of science. The narrator’s recollection of losing his leg and suddenly having 
a wood leg, I argue, is beyond Tulving’s basic yet fundamental specificity of memory 
functions. While the narrator apparently struggles to remember the ‘bad accident’, his 
recollection of how he came to possess a copy of de Sylby’s Golden Hours “with two 
last pages missing” is astonishingly lucid as he could “remember it more readily than 
[he did his] birthday” (O’Brien 1974, p. 8). The narrator is revealed to remember 
‘accidents’ and turning points in his life in a certain order as though decoding a certain 
bundle of data retained for “later” use: “All this and a lot more I understood clearly 
later” (ibid).  
The novel reveals the other harsh episodic reality within the first pages of the 
narrative: the narrator’s internal struggle with the loss of his family, beginning with his 
mother, which appears to him in the form of an indefinite senselessness, if not coma: 
 
“Then a certain year came […] and when the year was gone my father and 
mother were gone also. I was young and foolish and did not know properly why 
these people had all left me […] My mother was the first to go and I can 
remember a fat man [...] telling my father that there was no doubt where she was, 
that he could be as sure of that as he could of anything else in this vale of tears”.
                                   (O’Brien 1974, p. 8) 
 
While these losses obviously come from an external, physical reality they are 
archived, reviewed, re-examined only internally, creating a hellish personal virtuality 
that is more devastating than the stimulus itself. To escape this ‘circular’ hell, the 
narrator indulges in narrativizing his traumatic present in a fashion that follows that of 
Ó Cadhan’s Cré na Cille and is repeated by other literary giants such as Beckett in 
Malone Dies (1953): re-examining their past by creating a “fresh-forgetting of the 
unremembered”, namely, crafting a new internal microcosm based on an already 
experienced macrocosm (O’Brien 1974, p. 173). What O’Brien’s narrator shares with 
Ó Cadhan’s dead voices and Beckett’s almost dying Malone is a convoluted number of 
stories presented in spoken language, which as Maebh Long accurately identifies “fails 
to anchor or aid memory” (2014, p. 196).  
The novelty of The Third Policeman, however, unlike Beckett’s and Ó 
Cadhan’s narratives lies in its unforgiving effort to introduce its episodic reality as 
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factual as possible, verging on the basics of semantic memory. “The server shock”, 
assuredly claims O’Brien’s dead narrator, “which I encountered soon after re-entry to 
the barrack with the Sergeant set me thinking afterwards of the immense consolations 
which philosophy and religion can offer in adversity” (1974, p. 80). The argument 
sounds quite personal yet at once rather persuasive and promising, that while 
philosophy offers mental solidity and strength, religion soothes the wounds, for “they 
seem to lighten dark places and give strength to bear the unaccustomed load” (O’Brien 
1974, p. 80). The narrator unlike any far or immediate predecessor further expands his 
argument and “terms” such qualities as “therapeutic”, applying his understanding of the 
use of philosophy and religion to a poignant external reality (Ibid). It is this very 
moment that differentiates between O’Brien’s episodic reality in The Third Policeman 
and for instance, Ó Cadhan’s fragmented, colloquial recollection of past lives in the 
form of monologues and soliloquies in Cré na Cille, or Malone’s various macabre tales 
which allow him to “live beyond the grave” (Beckett 1953, p. 236). In other words, the 
reality O’Brien’s protagonist presents is neither fictitious nor hallucinated; rather, it can 
be read as a place where all mental responses to external stimuli converge. 
In other instances, the narrator is shown defending his mental vision of reality 
as being factual and beyond psychological imagery and data retrieval. To win such a 
bold assertion, in one instance, the narrator connects physical reality with his virtual, 
mental variety by comparing the ‘therapeutic’ effect of “liquors” on physical and 
“spiritual tissue” and de Selby’s “heart-lift[ing]” prose:  
 
“Golden Hours […] have a heart-lifted effect more usually associated with 
spirituous liquors, reviving and quietly restoring the spiritual tissue. This benign 
property of his prose is not […] to be attributed to the reason noticed by the 
eccentric du Garbandier, who said ‘the beauty of reading a page of de Selby is 
that it leads one inescapably to the happy conviction that one is not, of all 
nincompoops, the greatest”.                    (O’Brien 1974, p.80) 
 
For the narrator the reality of life is as “illusory” and mental as life itself, 
corroborating and affirming de Selby’s hypotheses that, “holding that the usual 
processes of living were illusory, it is natural that he did not pay much attention to 
life’s adversaries and he does not in fact offer much suggestion as to how they should 
be met” (O’Brien 1974, p. 80). For the narrator and his mentor, de Selby, difficulties 
and hardships that pertain to external, physical reality can only be resisted and then 
solved should one understand the pointlessness of life and physical reality. To confirm 
the ineffectiveness of the physical reality and life the narrator offers his understanding 
in the form of a recalled memory vis-à-vis how de Selby helped a young lady overcome 
a mundane problem. In this oral story within story, de Selby draws the attention of the 
young lady “to some fifty imponderable propositions each of which raised difficulties 
which spanned many eternities”, which in turn “dwarfed the conundrum of the young 
lady to nothingness” (O’Brien 1974, p. 82). In other words, to ‘dwarf’ the significance 
of the physical reality and at once to highlight the relevance and vastness of one’s 
virtual, internal reality, the narrator like his mentor creates a structure, underpinned by 
excessive footnotes and information overexposure. This will allow him to pinpoint his 
progress in not only excavating memories but polishing them with seemingly factual 
references such as making a mockery of du Garbandier’s effort to make “great play” 
out of a “fact” about how the “Atlas (Watkins)” was published, all in a cumbersome 
footnote (O’Brien 1974, p. 81). 
This crafted ‘fact out of fiction’ matrix, in other words, allows the narrator to 
find his place in a world of fantasy and at once a more physical reality of everyday-life 
by “re-discover[ing] the familiar”, and by enabling him to look at objects and 
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experiences from both internal-psychological and external-objective perspectives 
(O’Brien 1974, p. 173). This is very same internalisation of reality that Carl Jung 
discusses in Psychological Reflections (1973). For Jung one’s understanding of reality 
is just as real as their “love experience”, which “is the real experience of a real fact. 
Whether its object be of a physical, a psychic, or a metaphysical nature does not 
concern us. It is psychic reality, having the same dignity as the physical” (1973, 
pp.178-179). Such a semi-Jungian perception and the way O’Brien’s narrator looks 
back at his unrequited love affair with the ‘already suffered’ experiences can be 
explained in light of post-Hegelian phenomenology. 
 
WHAT IS IT LIKE TO BE A ‘DEAD MAN’ IN IRELAND? 
 
In a Hegelian phenomenology of the mind, we are allowed to understand mental 
visions as in mental reality through the lens of consciousness. To understand the 
external reality is to allow this consciousness to look at itself from within and to be 
looked at from the without, namely, through the experiences of others. In so doing, 
Hegel introduced ‘pure looking at’ (reines zusehen). If, in the Hegelian dialectic, the 
consciousness looks at reality the way it has been set by a governing system such as the 
State or society, it will just observe conventional objects which have been 
territorialised not only socially and politically but linguistically. However, it is through 
introspection and looking at one’s self from within and then externalising the observed 
varieties as in the form of re-visiting and re-imagining such realities that one can draw 
that thin line between what an object appears to be in the physical reality and what it 
can be when it is looked at from an internal perspective. Reality in this light resonates 
with what the individual might be observing yet from a personal dimension. 
In the context of a post-independence Ireland, where literature and especially 
the novel reflects the nation’s historical, social and political plights of formation under 
a postist regime, what emerges as the real greatly differs in terms of semantics and 
function from what has been experienced. The definition, in this instance, is twofold: 
national and personal.12 A national definition appears as an agrarian vision, heralding a 
postcolonial, independent Ireland, which complicates and at once contradicts the 
psychology of recalcitrant characters such as Stephen Dedalus and a large number of 
O’Brien’s fictional troupe such as the narrator in The Third Policeman or Finbarr and 
Manus in The Hard Life (1961) and De Selby in The Dalkey Archive (1964). The 
personal definition, however, has perhaps been best articulated by the narrator in The 
Third Policeman as, “an unusual experience to wake […] slowly, to let the brain climb 
lazily out of a deep sleep and shake itself and yet have no encounter with the light to 
guarantee that the sleep is really over” (O’Brien 1974, p. 144).  
In This Strange Institution Called Literature (1992), Jacques Derrida introduces 
poetico-literary performativity as yet another dimension of the text. Under this 
specificity, the text describes and at once critiques itself as it unravels its various parts. 
The Third Policeman can too be read as an example of poetico-literary performativity 
where not only reality but the text itself is constantly being described and critiqued. Not 
only does not the text close in on itself in completing its descriptiveness and 
simultaneous self-criticism, but it depends on what Woolf regarded as “an incessant 
shower of innumerable atoms” in the form of memories, be their conscious or 
unconscious, and reflexive autogenous definitions (Woolf 1925, p. 175). Although The 
Third Policeman is structured around a certain number of experiences and memories, it 
invents footnotes and invests heavily on it as an unexplored space where that ‘incessant 
shower of atoms’ can take place and help the narrator to describe, criticise and only 
then reuse such virtuals as a collective, reliable basis for his excavation of realities. 
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This self-induced contextual consciousness, namely, re-exploring a cartoonish variety 
of their world through the lens of a ‘dead man’, I argue, can be seen as a subtle and 
unique aspect of O’Brien’s novel, providing an unexplored leeway for the Irish to re-
experience what informs their national tradition of receiv[ing] [their] old tradition of 
nationhood” and unity from “the dead generations”.13 ‘What can be seen’ by the nation 
as a postcolonial reality is only a fruitless, ‘temporal’ and poignant mirage, whereas the 
reality they internalise based on their past experiences before the rise of a postist State 
can’t be policed by the State is ‘eternal’. Markers such as the land as noted by 
Anderson, or the significance of social and political identities in one’s recreation of 
reality, in this respect, not only lose their relevance but become disposable, replaceable 
atoms in one’s shower of virtuality. 
 	  
CONCLUSION 	  
For M. Keith Booker and Seamus Deane postcolonial literatures like The Third 
Policeman appear when a decolonising “globalism” clashes with a postcolonial 
“localism”, eventually bursting a “fake” postist bubble and revealing the naked harsh 
reality of what is it like to have no “personal identity”, as in being dead (Deane 1997, p. 
162). For these critics, especially Deane, the rise of a postist regime and postcoloniality 
replaced the authenticity and authority of Stephen’s ‘non serviam’ as a sign of rebellion 
with either conformity or escapist, fantastic narration. The latter, especially manifests 
itself in the oeuvre of authors whose Joycean tenets clash with the State’s politics of 
submission or exile, producing a body of literature that seeks resistance and at once 
solace in the phantasmagoric sub-reality of their stories.  
Unlike other critics, I find Stephen and O’Brien’s narrator as neither a static, 
ignorant lost generation nor a pessimistically empty caricature of the reality of 
formation under a postist State between the 1930s and the 1960s. Rather, they should 
be regarded as what I call the generation of in-betweeners, namely, an ambitious 
generation extended between the dualistic extremes of their forefathers and a static 
State, and their non-conformist vision, which sought liberation in building an Ireland 
that was neither politically territorial nor socially narrow. In Colonial Desire: Hybridity 
in Theory, Culture and Race, Robert J. C. Young (1995) analyses the very zeitgeist that 
encapsulates the generation of in-betweeners. According to Young, this generation was 
meant to be lulled by the State’s politics of hybridity: forming a nation who would feel 
paralysed and could no longer resist the State’s demands. The paralysis, Young claims, 
occurs due to close and sympathetic ties with the Other, namely, between the State as a 
worried father, defending the motherland and the othered young revolutionaries as the 
children of the land. The State’s vision, I content, is accurately in line with the 
Deleuzian desire of territorialisation whereby an even larger crowd could be controlled 
and normalised by way of socio-political stratification.  
The ideological riots and social oppositional movements advocated by Stephen 
and his generation should not be discarded as a byproduct of an immature and at once 
ambitious psyche. Rather, it resonates with what Franz Fanon introduces in Black Skin, 
White Masks (1952) as the “oppositional interaction” between the extreme poles of 
(post) coloniality, namely, the politically conscious dissidents and the static, 
(neo)colonial State (p. 143). Fanon regards postcolonial stasis as a result of the rise of 
the neocolonial ideology rather than a postcolonial ethos. In Black Skin, White Masks, 
by analysing the individuality and personal identity of Africans and the concomitant 
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clash with the dominant white State, Fanon explores the consequential roots of an 
oppositional interaction: 
 
A normal Negro child, having grown up within a normal family, will become 
abnormal on the slightest contact with the white world. This statement may not 
be immediately understandable. […] What do we see in the case of the black 
man? Unless we make use of that frightening postulate—which so destroys our 
balance— offered by Jung, the collective unconscious, we can understand 
absolutely nothing. A drama is enacted every day in colonised countries. How is 
one to explain, for example, that a Negro who has passed his baccalaureate and 
has gone to the Sorbonne to study to become a teacher of philosophy is already 
on guard before any conflictual elements have coalesced round him? René Ménil 
accounted for this reaction in Hegelian terms. In his view it was “the 
consequence of the replacement of the repressed [African] spirit in the 
consciousness of the slave by an authority symbol representing the Master, a 
symbol implanted in the subsoil of the collective group and charged with 
maintaining order in it as a garrison controls a conquered city.                    
(1952, pp. 111-112) 
 
In the case of Irish characters such as Joyce’s Stephen or the narrator in The 
Third Policeman, the divide has not been caused by a biological difference in their skin 
color; rather, it is the color and the intensity of their definition of anti-colonial reality 
and their critique of a gradual rise of neocolonial simulacrum that resulted in their exile 
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